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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the eects of changes in longevity and the
pace of technological progress on interest rates, savings behaviour and
optimal retirement decisions. In so doing we embed the dynamic op-
timization problem of choosing a life-cycle consumption path and the
retirement age into a general equilibrium setting. Thereby we assume
that technology evolves exogenously and the production side of the
economy can be described by means of a neoclassical production func-
tion. Our results show that (i) the aggregate capital to consumption
ratio increases and interest rates decrease in response to increases in
longevity; (ii) the response of the optimal retirement age to increases
in longevity is ambiguous. However, for reasonable parameter values
the optimal retirement age increases in longevity; (iii) the aggregate
capital to consumption ratio decreases and interest rates increase in re-
sponse to faster technological progress; (iv) the response of the optimal
retirement age to faster technological progress is ambiguous. However,
for reasonable parameter values the optimal retirement age increases
in the pace of technological improvements.
JEL classication: I15, J11, J26, O11
Keywords: endogenous retirement, life-cycle savings, population ag-
ing, technological progress, economic prosperity
11 Introduction
Over the last decades, increases in life expectancy brought tremendous wel-
fare gains by allowing people to live longer, spending more time as healthy
retirees and even to increase lifetime consumption. According to Bloom et al.
(2007b), life expectancy for the whole world rose from 30 to 65 over the past
150 years and there seems to be no tendency for it to level o. Furthermore,
Fries (1980), Mathers et al. (2001) and Mor (2005) suggest a compression of
morbidity in the sense that the number of years an individual can expect to
be healthy rises even faster than average life expectancy. While the individ-
ual gains of these demographic developments are out of question, population
aging and its potentially negative economic consequences have become a very
important topic not only in academic research but also in the public debate.
As examples for the latter, there have even been two special issues on the
economic consequences of aging societies in the magazine \The Economist"
over the last two years (The Economist, 2009, 2011), which emphasizes the
importance of the topic. Altogether the most important concerns are: if
people live longer | especially at older ages | they spend more time as
retirees, which threatens the sustainability of social security systems (cf.
Gruber and Wise, 1998; Gertler, 1999; Bloom et al., 2007a); when the co-
hort of the baby-boomers retires, the support ratio declines such that fewer
workers have to produce the goods and services that are consumed by all the
people living in an economy. This is often referred to as the \accounting ef-
fect" of population aging (see for example Gruescu, 2007; Bloom et al., 2008,
2010a); a workforce that grows older can exert negative economic inuences
if older workers are less productive than younger ones (see Skirbekk, 2008,
for an overview); population aging directly aects long-run economic growth
perspectives via its impact upon a societies' desire to invest in research and
development (see Prettner and Prskawetz, 2010, for an overview).
In this paper we focus on a closely related aspect namely the private
optimal responses to demographic change, which are often referred to as its
\behavioral eects". For example, if individuals expect to live longer, they
will change, among other things, their savings behavior and their retirement
decisions. While the former and its associated repercussions on economic
growth have already been analyzed intensively in the dynamic general equi-
librium literature (see for example Reinhart, 1999; Futagami and Nakajima,
22001; Petrucci, 2002; Heijdra and Ligthart, 2006; Heijdra and Mierau, 2011,
and references therein), there are only a few papers analyzing the latter
(see for example Bloom et al., 2007a,b; Kuhn et al., 2010), and we are only
aware of one contribution that builds both aspects into a small open econ-
omy framework (Heijdra and Romp, 2009). Since Heijdra and Romp (2009)
feature a very rich demographic structure, they have to assume that the
interest rate evolves exogenously. This is justied for a small open economy
but in large or closed economies it is important to take endogenous interest
rates into consideration. The reason is that the interest rate responds to
changes in aggregate savings such that there are important feedback eects
between the behavior of consumers and the reaction of rms. These feed-
back eects exert additional inuences on the optimal retirement age which
cannot be captured within a partial equilibrium setting or within a frame-
work relying on exogenously evolving interest rates. By contrast, taking
endogenous interest rates into account allows us to sketch out the general
equilibrium interdependences between savings, interest rates, technological
progress, optimal individual retirement decisions and longevity.
The model we use builds upon the life-cycle behavior of individuals de-
scribed in Bloom et al. (2007a) and Bloom et al. (2007b) which we imple-
ment as the demand side into a neoclassical growth model with exogenous
technological progress. In so doing we endogenize wages and interest rates
allowing for additional channels through which changes in exogenous vari-
ables can exert an inuence on the choice of the optimal retirement age.
However, this complicates our modeling framework substantially such that
we abstract from the very detailed demographic structure that is featured
by Heijdra and Romp (2009).
We nd that an increase in longevity raises aggregate savings as com-
pared to aggregate consumption and thereby reduces the interest rate. The
overall eect of higher life expectancy on the optimal retirement age is am-
biguous. On the one hand there are the direct eects that rst, higher life
expectancy reduces disincentives to work and second, there are the prospects
of increases in lifetime consumption associated with working longer. On the
other hand there are two opposing indirect eects on the choice of an op-
timal retirement age which are due to the associated reduction in interest
rates. First, individuals would have to work longer to compensate for the
fall in capital income but second, the eects of compound interest on life-
3time labor income are weakened such that individuals could be tempted to
enjoy leisure earlier. If the latter indirect eect is very strong, then it could
potentially oset the positive indirect and direct eects of longevity on the
retirement age.
Furthermore, we nd that faster technological progress leads to a de-
crease in aggregate capital as compared to aggregate consumption which
increases the interest rate. In this case the overall eect on the optimal
retirement age is again ambiguous. While faster technological progress and
hence faster economic growth means higher lifetime income and thus in-
creases the demand for leisure such that people would like to retire earlier,
the increase in wages at older ages raises incentives to retire later. In ad-
dition, the described opposing eects of changes in interest rates work and
the overall eect of an increase in the pace of technological progress on the
optimal retirement age crucially depends on the relative strength of all the
positive and negative eects.
Finally, we are able to characterize parameter restrictions under which
increases in longevity and the pace of technological progress positively im-
pact upon the optimal retirement age and we show that these parameter
restrictions tend to be fullled in industrialized countries. This implies that
people would like to retire later in response to increases in life expectancy as
long as public pension schemes do not provide excessive incentives for early
retirement. This result is in line with Bloom et al. (2007a) and Heijdra and
Romp (2009).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the theoret-
ical model. First we solve the individual dynamic optimization problem of
choosing a consumption-savings path and a retirement age. Then we derive
laws of motion for aggregate capital and aggregate savings by integrating
over all cohorts alive at a certain point in time. Section 3 contains our
analyses with respect to the impacts of changing longevity and changing
technological progress on interest rates, aggregate savings and the optimal
retirement age. Finally, in section 4 we conclude an sketch out some possible
interventions for policy-makers.
42 The model
To analyze the interrelations between longevity, aggregate savings, optimal
retirement and economic growth we merge three strands of the literature.
First we derive individually optimal consumption-savings and retirement
decisions based upon Bloom et al. (2007a). We then aggregate over in-
dividuals to derive expressions for optimal economy-wide consumption ex-
penditure growth and economy-wide capital accumulation by relying on the
overlapping generations literature of Blanchard (1985). Finally, we close the
model by considering a neoclassical production side of the economy in the
vein of Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), where nal output
is produced with capital and labor and we allow for exogenously evolving
technological progress.
2.1 The individual consumption-savings-retirement decision
Following Bloom et al. (2007a), individuals born at time t0 maximize their




e (+) [u(c)   (z;t)]dt; (1)
where  is the discount rate,  represents the mortality rate, u(c) refers to
instantaneous utility gained by consuming the amount c of the consumption
good (which we take as the num eraire),  (z;t) describes instantaneous
disutility of labor given life expectancy z at time t and  is an indicator
function with value 1 when working and zero when retired. We supress time
arguments whenever it is possible. Individuals choose the amount of optimal
consumption over time and their retirement age, i.e., the date when they
switch between  = 1 and  = 0. Note that the discount rate is augmented
by the mortality rate because, as compared to an innite horizon setting,
people who face the risk of death are less likely to postpone consumption
into the future. The wealth constraint of individuals reads
_ k = w + ( + r)k   c; (2)
where k denotes an individual's capital stock | which we assume to be
the only savings vehicle and hence it represents an individual's wealth |
5and w is wage income. Basically this specication tells us that individuals
like to consume more over their life course because it increases utility. In
order to be able doing so they have to earn a wage income, while working
eort is associated with disutility. Consequently, individuals not only have
to deal with the optimal intertemporal consumption-savings decision but
also with the trade-o between consumption and leisure. Furthermore, we
make use of the assumption introduced by Yaari (1965) that there exists
a perfect and fair life insurance company at which individuals can insure
themselves against the risk of dying with positive assets. This life insurance
company pays individuals a higher than the market rate of return on their
capital holdings and in exchange it gets all the wealth of an individual who
dies. As a consequence, the life insurance company redistributes capital of
individuals who died among those who survived.
In order to get analytical solutions, we assume that the utility function
is logarithmic, i.e., u(c) = log(c) and that disutility of work increases ex-
ponentially at the mortality rate, i.e., at a certain instant t we have that
(z;t) = de(t t0) whereby d is a scaling constant measuring the unwill-
ingness of individuals to work. The rst assumption leads to the following
individual consumption Euler equation
_ c = (r   )c
stating that | similar to the standard neoclassical growth model with in-
nite lifetime horizons (cf. Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) |
consumption expenditure growth is positive if and only if the interest rate
exceeds the rate of pure time preference. This will be the case if the nancial
sector is willing to pay an interest rate that overcompensates individuals for
sacricing consumption today in order to get consumption in the future. As
shown by Yaari (1965), in case of full and fair life insurance coverage, the
higher discounting of individuals due to the risk of death is exactly oset by
the higher interest rate paid by the life insurance company. Furthermore, if
individuals should be willing to work at time t, the instantaneous marginal
utility of doing so must not be less than the instantaneous marginal utility
of leisure, i.e., the negative disutility of work, and we have
 = 1 , u0(c)w  (z;t): (3)
6Intuitively this equation states that individuals will work as long as the
additional utility of working longer in terms of the associated higher con-
sumption is able to compensate them for their disutility of sacricing leisure
time.
Noting that lifetime consumption expenditures have to be equal to life-
time income and denoting the retirement date of an individual by T, the







Integrating and using c(t0;t) = c(t0;t0)e(r )(t t0), which follows from the
individual Euler equation, and w(t0;t) = w(t0;t0)eg(t t0), which follows from
denoting wage growth by g, we arrive at an expression for the fraction of











Bloom et al. (2007a) mention that in their partial equilibrium setting g <
r+ has to hold for the model to make sense. In a general equilibrium setting
with overlapping generations, we will see that this condition is automatically
fullled for all death rates along a balanced growth path. Next, we denote
the optimal retirement date by T such that the optimal retirement age is
given by R = T t0 which can be implicitly expressed as a function of the







Intuitively, this expression tells us that if individuals tend to consume more
in relation to initial income, i.e., they save less, then they have to retire
later. To put it dierently, individuals can \buy" early retirement by saving
more. Next we put equations (5) and (6) together which nally yields
( + )d = ( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e(g r )R
(7)
being an implicit relationship between the optimal retirement age and the
7mortality rate, the discount rate, the measure for the unwillingness to work,
the pace of wage growth and the interest rate. In contrast to Bloom et al.
(2007a) and Heijdra and Romp (2009), the interest rate will be endogenous
in equilibrium.
2.2 Aggregation over cohorts
There is not only one single representative individual in our model economy.
Instead, we have to integrate over all cohorts that are alive at a certain
instant t to come up with expressions for aggregate consumption expenditure
growth and aggregate capital accumulation. Denoting the aggregate capital
stock by K and aggregate consumption expenditures by C leads us to the









where N(t0;t) denotes the size of the cohort born at time t0 at date t and
k(t0;t) and c(t0;t) are their capital holdings and consumption levels, respec-
tively. In order to simplify exposition and in line with Blanchard (1985),
we assume that the birth rate equals the death rate such that the ow of
newborns is N(t;t) = N(t), where N(t) =
R t
 1 N(t0;t)dt0  N represents
the total population size. Note that each cohort is of size Ne(t0 t) at a
certain date t > t0. Taking into account these demographic structures and
carrying out the calculations in appendix B leads to the following law of
motion for the aggregate capital stock and to the following aggregate Euler
equation
_ K = rK   C + W; (10)
_ C
C




where W refers to aggregate wage income if the whole living population
would work, while  denotes the fraction of the population who are still
supplying their skills on the labor market, i.e., who are not yet retired. We
see that in contrast to the law of motion for individual capital, the mortal-
ity rate does not show up on the aggregate level. The reason is that the
8life insurance company only redistributes wealth of people who died among
those who survived, while it does not create or destroy any capital. Further-
more, we see that aggregate consumption expenditure growth falls short of
individual consumption expenditure growth because at each instant a frac-
tion of older and therefore wealthier people die and they are replaced by
poorer newborns who cannot aord that much consumption. This continu-
ally ongoing process slows down aggregate consumption expenditure growth
as compared to individual consumption expenditure growth (cf. Heijdra and
van der Ploeg, 2002).
One of the properties of a balanced growth path is that the growth rate
of wages corresponds to the growth rates of aggregate consumption and
aggregate capital, i.e., we have that _ C=C = _ K=K = _ W=W. Then, as a
consequence of equation (11) and as already mentioned in subsection 2.1,
the condition g < r +  is always fullled because
g = r      ( + )
K
C
< r + 
and the net present value of lifetime income is nite.
Finally, in order to come up with analytical solutions, we rewrite the
economy-wide wealth constraint as _ K = Y   C with Y being gross domes-
tic product (GDP). This equation states that everything that is produced
is either spent on consumption or invested in the form of capital goods.
Altogether this means that the following three equations fully describe the
consumption side of our model economy
_ K = Y   C; (12)
_ C
C




( + )d = ( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e(g r )R
; (14)
where the rst equation is the economy-wide resource constraint, the sec-
ond equation is the aggregate Euler equation and the third equation is the
implicit relation of the optimal retirement age to the interest rate, the exoge-
nously given preference parameters and the mortality rate. In the following,
we will denote the relation between aggregate consumption expenditures
and the aggregate capital stock C=K | also being a measure of aggregate
savings | by . Furthermore, we will close the model by assuming that
9the rm sector can be described by a neoclassical production function and
therefore conforms to the workhorse neoclassical growth models of Solow
(1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). This allows us to analyze the
interrelations between longevity and economic growth on the one hand, and
the retirement age and aggregate savings on the other hand within a general
equilibrium setting.1
2.3 The production side of the economy
In order to describe the rm sector of our model economy, we rely on the
neoclassical growth literature (cf. Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965)
and allow for exogenous technological progress. The aggregate production
function can be written as
Y = K(AN)1 ; (15)
where A is the technological frontier of the economy growing at rate 0 <
g = _ A=A and 0 <  < 1 is the capital share in aggregate production. Note
that the growth rate of technology is the same as those of wages, the reason
being that wage growth along a balanced growth path is determined by labor
augmenting technological improvements. Assuming perfect competition in












1We also considered two other ways of describing the production side of the economy.
The rst followed the learning-by-doing endogenous growth literature (see for example
Arrow, 1962; Frankel, 1962; Romer, 1986) and the second followed the literature of en-
dogenous technological progress (see for example Romer, 1990). However, the expressions
and interrelations were too involved to come up with analytical results in these cases.










( + )d = ( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e(g r )R
; (19)
where the endogenous variables are r, R and . We are now interested in
changes of these endogenous variables in response to changes in mortality
and changes in the pace of technological progress.
3 Consequences of changing mortality and the pace
of technological progress
The system dened by equations (17)-(19) can be solved explicitly for r and
. However, we have to resort to implicit comparative statics (cf. Gandolfo,
2010, pp. 325-338) in order to analyze the dependence of the optimal retire-
ment age on the parameters we are interested in. First, we will consider the
eects of changes in longevity on the interest rate, the capital to consump-
tion ratio and the optimal retirement age and then we will proceed to the
impact of the pace of technological progress on the same set of endogenous
variables.
3.1 The eects of changing mortality
First we analyze the response of an economies' consumption to capital ratio
and its interest rate to decreases in mortality. Solving the system dened





g + g +  +
p




g +    g +
p
( g + g + )2 + 4( + )
2
: (21)
Now we are able to state the following proposition.
2We solved the system in Mathematica 6.0. This leads to two solution pairs, one of
which can be ruled out because it involves negative values of .
11Proposition 1. An increase in longevity raises aggregate savings as com-
pared to aggregate consumption and lowers the interest rate.














( g + g + )2 + 4( + )
: (23)
These two expressions are unambiguously positive and since an increase in
longevity is represented by a decrease in mortality , the above proposition
holds.
The intuition for this nding is that as longevity increases, individuals
perform consumption smoothing and choose to save more when they are
young in order to be able to sustain a certain consumption expenditure
level during their prolonged period of retirement. This leads to a higher
aggregate capital stock and because of decreasing returns to capital to a
lower interest rate.
Next, we analyze the response of household's retirement decisions to
decreases in mortality. This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in longevity has an ambiguous eect on the
optimal retirement age. If the retirement age is already high, increases in
longevity raise the optimal retirement age further.
















  R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
  Rd( + )e(g r )R
;
A2 = (g +    r   )( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+(g   r   )d( + )e(g r )R
:








Furthermore, since we are interested in the eects of changing mortality on
the retirement age, we substitute the third column of the Jacobian by the

















  R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+de(g r )R
  Rd( + )e(g r )R
  d:











Altogether we can then analyze the eects of changes in longevity on the





















Recall from the aggregate Euler equation that the relations r > g and g <
g +  < r +  have to hold in equilibrium. Therefore we know that A2 < 0
and A1 > A3. Consequently, @R=@ < 0 will hold for sure if A1 < 0. The
last inequality in turn is always fullled if
R( + r   g) > 1: (24)
In case of a retirement age of zero, this inequality is violated, while in case
of a retirement age corresponding to life-expectancy 1=, the inequality is
fullled. Since it is more likely that this inequality holds if the optimal
retirement age is high, the proposition holds.
13The intuition behind this result is the following. We have the direct
eect of increases in longevity on an individual's optimal retirement decision
apparent from equation (7). Dividing this equation by ( + ) and taking
the derivative of the right hand side (RHS) with respect to mortality yields
@RHS
@
= ( + r   g)

g +    r
( + )2 e(g+ r )R









which is negative for sure because we know from the aggregate Euler equa-
tion that g +    r < 0. This means that in order to fulll equation (7) for
given d, individuals would want to work longer in case that life expectancy
increases. However, there is also an indirect eect due to the decrease in the
interest rate induced by the higher aggregate capital stock (see proposition
1). This decrease has two opposing eects: on the one hand individuals
would want to work longer in order to compensate for the implied loss of
lifetime capital income. On the other hand, the compensation of working
longer decreases because the eect of compound interest is weakened. If the
retirement age is high (and the period of retirement to be nanced out of
savings is shorter), the former eect dominates. By contrast, if the retire-
ment age is low (and the period of retirement to be nanced out of savings is
longer), the latter eect is more likely to prevail. For a very low retirement
age there is the theoretical possibility that the negative indirect eect due
to decreases in the interest rate even overcompensates for the positive direct
and indirect eects.
Finally, we summarize our ndings regarding a demographic transition
from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3. A demographic transition from high fertility and mortality
to low fertility and mortality is associated with an increase in wages

















such that the aggregate labor to capital ratio L=K and the interest rate








Since A and  are exogenously given, a decrease in L=K is asscociated with
increasing wages. Consequently, due to proposition 1, interest rates decrease
following a demographic transition, while the aggregate capital-labor ratio
and wages rise.
The intuitive explanation is that a demographic shift from high fertility
and mortality to low fertility and mortality induces a decrease in labor sup-
ply because individuals adjust their retirement age less than proportionally.
Furthermore, they have to save more in order to sustain consumption during
the prolonged period of retirement. Both eects raise the aggregate capital
to labor ratio, leading to higher wages. These ndings are in line with the
results of Lee and Mason (2010) and are complementary to the eects of the
demographic devidend as described in Bloom et al. (2003) and Bloom et al.
(2010b).
3.2 The eect of changing the pace of technological progress
Next, we analyze the response of the aggregate savings to consumption ratio
and the interest rate to increases in the pace of exogenous technological
progress governing the growth rate of the economy. In this case we state the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. An increase in economic growth raises aggregate consump-
tion as compared to aggregate savings and raises the interest rate.
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(1   )(g +    g)
2
p
(g +    g)2 + 4( + )
: (29)
These two expressions are unambiguously positive, therefore the proposition
holds.
The intuition is that with increasing economic growth, individuals can
expect higher future earnings and therefore they do not need to save that
much to sustain the same level of consumption. Due to this decrease in
savings, the capital stock is lower and hence the marginal product of capital,
i.e., the interest rate, is higher.
Finally, we analyze the response of household's retirement decisions to
faster technological progress and hence economic growth. In this case we
state the following proposition.
Proposition 5. An increase in economic growth has an ambiguous eect on
the optimal retirement age. If the retirement age is already high, increases
in economic growth raise the optimal retirement age further.
Proof. We are interested in the eects of changing economic growth on the
optimal retirement age and therefore we substitute the third column of the

















+ R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ Rd( + )e(g r )R
:














Altogether we can then analyze the eects of changes in economic growth















Recall again from the aggregate Euler equation that the relations r > g and
g < g +  < r +  have to hold in equilibrium. Therefore we know that
A2 < 0 and the whole expression will be positive if
A4

+ A1 > 0: (31)
Since  < 1 this inequality is fullled for sure if
R( + r   g) > 1:
In case of a retirement age of zero this inequality is violated, while in case
of a retirement age corresponding to life-expectancy 1=, the inequality is
fullled. Since it is more likely that this inequality holds if the optimal
retirement age is high, the proposition holds.
The intuition for this result is a little bit dierent from the one for
proposition 2. Again we have the direct eect of increases in growth on
an individual's optimal retirement decision apparent from equation (7). Di-
viding this equation by ( + ) and taking the derivative of the RHS with










which has an ambiguous sign because there are now two opposing direct
eects of increasing economic growth on the optimal retirement decision. On
the one hand, faster growth leads to higher lifetime income which increases
demand for consumption and leisure since both are normal goods. Higher
demand for leisure implies that people retire earlier. On the other hand, as a
consequence of faster economic growth, individuals will have a higher income
at the age when they would have decided to retire in case of unchanged
growth. This eect leads them to postpone the retirement age (see equation
17(3)) and hence already the overall impact of the direct eect is ambiguous.
In addition, however, there is also the indirect eect due to the increase in
the interest rate induced by lower3 aggregate savings (see proposition 4).
This associated increase in the interest rate has again two opposing eects.
On the one hand, individual's lifetime income increases due to the higher
interest rate which again increases demand for leisure and hence reduces
the optimal retirement age. On the other hand, working at older ages has a
larger positive impact on lifetime income because it leads compound interest
to exert its inuence longer. If the retirement age is high (and the period
of retirement to be nanced out of savings is shorter), the former eect
dominates. By contrast, if the retirement age is low (and the period of
retirement to be nanced out of savings is longer), the latter eect is more
likely to prevail. Consequently, considering the direct and the indirect eect
together, we have that for low levels of the retirement age, the optimal
response to faster economic growth is to decrease the retirement age further,
while the converse holds true for high levels of the retirement age.
3.3 Numerical assessment
In order to check the validity of the condition described in equation (24), we
consider the G8 countries over the years 1990-2009 and obtain the average
real interest rate, the average economic growth rate and the mortality rate
implied by life expectancy at birth in the year 2009. Then we calculate the




 + r   g
:
The results are depicted in table 1 with the data being obtained from World
Bank (2012). The average interest rates for Germany and Italy were calcu-
lated over the years 1990-2002 and 1990-2004, respectively.
We see that in all the countries listed, the implied threshold retirement
age is much lower than the actual retirement age (see for example OECD,
2009, for an overview). This implies that for the G8 countries we can be sure
that | according to our model | increases in life expectancy and increases
in economic growth raise the individually optimal retirement age. In reality,
3Note that the indirect eect works exactly the other way round as compared to the
results in proposition 2.
18Table 1: Implied  R for the G8 countries
Canada France Germany Italy
r 0.0423 0.0596 0.0878 0.0556
g 0.0227 0.0165 0.0158 0.0098
 0.0123 0.0123 0.0125 0.0123
 R 31.3480 18.0505 11.8343 17.2117
Japan Russia UK USA
r 0.0330 0.0667 0.0301 0.0455
g 0.0110 0.0280 0.0199 0.0252
 0.0121 0.0145 0.0125 0.0127
 R 29.3255 18.7970 44.0529 30.3030
however, there often exists a mandatory retirement age and/or nancial
and non-nancial incentives to retire early | often even earlier than at the
mandatory retirement age (Blondal and Scarpetta, 1997; Gruber and Wise,
1998). Therefore, from a policy perspective, it could prove useful to remove
incentives for early retirement and to link the mandatory retirement age
| at least to a certain extent | to life expectancy (see also Bloom et al.,
2007a).
Another aspect worth mentioning is related to the discussion regarding
the negative impact of demographic change on economic prosperity. It is
often argued that an increase in life expectancy decreases the size of the
labor force relative to the number of retirees which lowers overall living
standards because fewer people have to share a larger burden. We can |
up to a certain point | address this issue within our considerations. From
the aggregate production function, equation (15), it follows that
y = kA1 R; (33)
where y is per capita GDP, k is the eective capital labor ratio and we
used that  = R. Now we see that ceteris paribus the direct eect of
decreasing mortality is that the fraction of people in retirement increases
relative to the fraction of workers and hence per capita GDP decreases.
This is the accounting eect of population aging (cf. Bloom et al., 2010a).
However, there are also behavioral changes going on namely that the optimal
retirement age and the aggregate capital to consumption ratio (which is
19an indicator for savings), increase. Consequently, the behavioral changes
will tend to increase R and k in the above equation and therefore act as
mitigating forces for the negative accounting eect of population aging.
4 Conclusions
We implemented a model of optimal individual retirement and optimal in-
dividual life-cycle consumption into a general equilibrium framework, where
the interest rate and the aggregate consumption to capital ratio are endoge-
nously determined. We have seen that the individual responses to changes
in longevity and economic growth are to change the savings behavior and to
change the desired retirement age. In contrast to Bloom et al. (2007a) and
Heijdra and Romp (2009) there are feedback eects of the individual savings
decision on the equilibrium interest rate and therefore we get an additional
channel through which changes in longevity and changes in economic growth
impact upon the optimal retirement age.
In particular, we nd that an increase in longevity raises the aggregate
capital to consumption ratio and therefore decreases the interest rate. The
overall eect of increases in longevity on the optimal retirement age is am-
biguous but for reasonable parameter values | implied by data for the G8
countries | the optimal retirement age increases as a consequence of in-
creasing longevity. Furthermore, we also showed that the aggregate capital
to consumption ratio and the interest rate rise after the growth rate of the
economy increases. In this case the overall eect of faster growth on the
optimal retirement age is ambiguous but again for the parameter values as-
sociated with the G8 countries we can be sure that | within the connes of
our modeling framework | the optimal retirement age increases in economic
growth.
In addition, our simplied theoretical framework is able to describe two
behavioral changes in response to population aging, namely, an increase in
savings and an increase in the retirement age. These two behavioral changes
represent important forces for compensating some of the negative impacts
due to the accounting eect of population aging.
From a policy perspective we can conclude that for reasonable parame-
ter values, an increase in longevity should be accompanied by increases in
the mandatory retirement age and/or by removing incentives for early re-
20tirement. This policy recommendation also holds in the partial equilibrium
framework of Bloom et al. (2007a) and in the small open economy frame-
work of Heijdra and Romp (2009). Both of these contributions show that
individuals prefer to work longer when life expectancy increases and interest
rates stay constant. On the aggregate level, the mechanism that we outlined
has the additional eect of increasing per capita GDP and therefore miti-
gating some negative economic impacts attributable to the accounting eect
of population aging.
We hope that our analysis is able to shed some light on the interrelations
between savings and retirement decisions. However, our framework is very
stylized and a multitude of possible ways to make the model more realistic
remain for further research. The most promising ones are in our opinion to
introduce capital market imperfections, alternative social security systems
and performing simulation studies for an economy whose production side is
described in an alternative manner.
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Appendix
A Optimal consumption and retirement
The control variables of the individual optimization problem are c and 
and we have the following current value Hamiltonian
H = u(c)   (z;t) + [w + ( + r)k   c]: (34)
21The rst oder conditions (FOCs) are
u0(c) = ; (35)
 (z;t)   w for  = 1; (36)
 (z;t)   w for  = 0; (37)
( + r) = ( + )   _ : (38)




= _ c: (39)
Finally, we have
 (z;t)   u0(c)w for  = 1
 = 1 , u0(c)w  (z;t): (40)



















































Now we denote the optimal retirement time by T such that the optimal
retirement age is given by R = T   t0 and we arrive at the following




























 + r   g
;
 + 
 + r   g
=
( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e (+r g)R
d( + r   g)
;
( + )d = ( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e(g r )R
being an implicit function for the optimal retirement age R (see also Bloom
et al., 2007a).
B Aggregating over cohorts










23such that dierentiating equations (43) and (44) with respect to time yields
_ C(t) = N
Z t
 1





+ Nc(t;t)   0




_ K(t) = N
Z t
 1













Note that newborns do not own any capital, i.e., k(t;t) = 0, because there
are no bequests. From equation (2) it follows that
_ K(t) =  K(t) + N
Z t
 1
[w + ( + r)k(t0;t)   c(t0;t)]e (t t0)dt0;














=  K(t) + ( + r)K(t)   C(t) + W(t);
= rK(t)   C(t) + W(t)
which is the aggregate law of motion for capital, whereby W refers to aggre-
gate wage income if the whole living population would work and  denotes
the fraction of the population N who are still supplying their skills on the
labor market, i.e., who are not yet retired.
Reformulating an agents optimization problem subject to its lifetime
budget restriction, stating that the present value of lifetime consumption
expenditures has to be equal to the present value of lifetime wage income















where the discount factor is DA(;t) =
R 






































) c(t0;t) = ( + )[k(t0;t) + h(t)]; (48)
where h refers to human wealth, i.e., wage income, of individuals. Human
wealth does not depend on the date of birth because productivity is age
independent. The above calculations show that optimal consumption in the
planning period is proportional to total wealth with a marginal propensity








e(t0 t)( + )[k(t0;t) + h(t)]dt0
= ( + )[K(t) + H(t)]: (49)
Note that this implies that aggregate human wealth is dened as H(t) =
N
R t
 1 e(t0 t)h(t)dt0 = Nh(t). Newborns do not own capital because
there are no bequests. Therefore
c(t;t) = ( + )h(t) (50)
25holds for each newborn individual. Putting equations (39), (45), (49) and
(50) together yields









= r    +
( + )H(t)   ( + )[K(t) + H(t)]
C(t)
= r      ( + )
K(t)
C(t)
which is the aggregate Euler equation.





     g = 0; (51)
II := r      ( + )
1

  g = 0; (52)
III := ( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ d( + )e(g r )R
  ( + )d = 0:
(53)
























IIIR = (g +    r   )( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+(g   r   )d( + )e(g r )R
;
III = e(g+ r )R
  R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+de(g r )R
  Rd( + )e(g r )R
  d;
IIIg =  e(g+ r )R
+ R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+Rd( + )e(g r )R
;
















  R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
 Rd( + )e(g r )R
;
A2 = (g +    r   )( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+(g   r   )d( + )e(g r )R
:







which, by the correspondence principle, ought to be negative. From equa-
tion (52) it follows that A2 < 0 and consequently,  has the desired sign.
Furthermore, if we are interested in the eects of changing mortality on the















where we substituted the third column of the Jacobian by the partial deriva-
tives of the system with respect to mortality and we have that
A3 = e(g+ r )R
  R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+de(g r )R
  Rd( + )e(g r )R
  d:
































Next, if we are interested in the eects of changing economic growth on the














28where we substituted the third column of the Jacobian by the partial deriva-
tives of the system with respect to economic growth and we have that
A4 =  e(g+ r )R
+ R( + r   g)e(g+ r )R
+ Rd( + )e(g r )R
:
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